ESSAY

THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF PROBABILITIES BY RAMÓN DE ELÍA AND RENÉ LAPRISE
he use of probabilities in weather forecasting has become the most common way of conveying the chance of occurrence of a future event. Although accepted as a standard tool, the concept of probability involves a great deal of complexity that is sometimes not appreciated in our community. For years there have been several schools of thought regarding the interpretation of probability, and the debate includes fi elds of study as diverse as philosophy, risk theory, and artifi cial intelligence. Th ere are fundamental diff erences among these interpretations, and these are not diminishing with our growing scientifi c understanding.
Until a few years ago, most members of the meteorological community were satisfi ed to think of probabilities as either the product of past knowledge projected into the future (as when a histogram of frequencies of occurrence is viewed as a probability distribution), or as a personal degree of belief regarding the occurrence of the event (based on several sources of information, but ultimately a personal opinion). Although both interpretations satisfy the conditions of probability calculus, one could wonder (and many have wondered) if these two interpretations are really describing the same thing.
Th e situation has not improved with the arrival of ensemble forecasting. Now, the probability of the occurrence of an event can be obtained as a direct result of numerical forecasting, suggesting that this probability may be linked to the intrinsic predictability of the event. Th is may make the meaning of probability an altogether diff erent thing. And, as is the case with any forecast variable, questions arise about the error or uncertainty associated with this predicted probability. For example, ensemble forecast systems of similar skill from diff erent weather offi ces routinely disagree over the probability of occurrence of some future events. What, then, is the uncertainty of our measure of uncertainty? Could it sometimes be as large as the entire [0,1] interval, the formulated probability value being therefore meaningless?
This question is often only academic for three reasons: fi rst, for most common and recurrent events, past probabilities can be verifi ed against outcomes so as to give a sense of prediction skill. Second, the waiting time between the forecast and the event is normally too short to allow for a lengthy discussion or for predictability to become very poor; and third, because what is at stake to users may not be important or contentious enough to justify such a debate.
However, forecasting is now being pushed to the limits of what we know, partly by pressures exerted by society for meteorologists to deliver increasingly accurate and timely forecasts, and here the use and meaning of probability becomes problematic. We can fi nd examples of this in the forecasting of rare extreme events (e.g., such as the prediction, by a member of an ensemble forecast system, of a hurricane landfall in an area usually free of these kinds of storms), but a clearer case emerges in climate change studies. Th e impact of CO 2 increase on climate will not be known until the next generation, but today the community is asked to deliver an estimation of the global warming threat. Due to the innumerable factors that infl uence the fi nal outcome, even our best prediction eff orts involve some educated guessing (normally in probability form). Th ere is a heated debate within the climate change community regarding how to convey uncertainty in predictions, since this reporting may have a profound impact on diff erent sectors of our society. No consensus has been reached regarding the role numerical probabilities should occupy.
Scientists are normally aware that a probability communicated to the public may be used in a decision-making process (through Expected Utility Th eory, for example), and feel confi dent about the value of the provided information in the case of events that occur frequently. However, when the event is uncommon and decisions of a far-reaching | 1225 and long-term nature (such as those in the Kyoto accord in response to predicted global warming) or of a life-or-death magnitude (as in hurricane landfalls) are to be considered, ambiguities regarding probabilities surface, and the incapacity of obtaining a clear measure of uncertainty for the outcome of a future event becomes a burden. In addition, the evaluation of the probability of an event becomes intertwined with the risk posed by this event and the production of a probability value becomes close to decision-making itself. Under these circumstances, probability forecasts become vulnerable to attack and diffi cult to defend in the face of confl icting opinions.
In conclusion, on the one hand, the use of probabilities in highly recurrent events has produced innumerable benefits thanks to the availability of skillful forecasts, whether obtained from a frequency of occurrence distribution, from expert advice, or from ensemble prediction. Whatever the origin of the estimated probability, objectivity or a sense of objectivity is reached through the verifi cation of an existing record. On the other hand, confi dence and the sense of objectivity weaken in the forecasting of unique or very uncommon events, leaving room for conscious or unconscious manipulation on the part of forecasters, decision-making offi cials, or interest groups. And this could happen in the most potentially devastating of situations. An eff ort in the clarifi cation of this complex topic must be pursued within our community and with the public to reduce unfounded expectations regarding what we can really do. Delivering incontestable probability forecasts for events with no historical record is something that, unfortunately, we cannot do.
